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FREEDOM OF S'PEECH AND OF THE PRESS IN THE
FEDERALIST PERIOD; THE SEDITION ACT.

T

HE constitutional problem to which the Espionage Act of 1917
gave rise is almost as old as the Government itself. As early
as 1798 the constitutional authority of the Government over speech
,and the press was called into question. The controversy caused by
the Sedition Act of that date forms the subject of this paper.
During the Federalist period of our history, the interference of
foreign powers in our domestic affairs was an open secret. The
French propaganda, which had been carried on since 1793 with the
purpose of involving us in the Anglo-French war, and persistent
attempts to separate Americans from their Government seemed to
when it
necessitate some restrictive measures. Early in 1798,
1
seemed that we were on the verge of war with France, libels against
the Government had been punished by the courts under the common law. 2 The severity with which this law was administered and
the doubts as to the exact provisions of it in regard to libels led to
the demand for legislative enactments on that subject, and. the Federalist majority in Congress hastily passed the Sedition Act to meet
the situation. It reads as follows:
"If any persons shall unlawfully combine or conspire together,
with intent to oppose any measure or measures of the Government of the United States, which are or shall be directed by
proper authority, or to impede the operation of any law of the
2See CHAXXXXCo

HISTnoY oy THE UNITED STATES. Vol. 4. a2i.

2 These prosecutions were probably based on the following utterance of Judge Peters

in U. S. v. Wrrall. 2 Dallas. 384-396:

"The power to punish misdemeanors is originally and strictly a common law power,

of which, I think, the United States are possessed.

It might have been exercised by

Congress in the form of a Legislative Act; but it may also, in my opinion, be enforced
in the course of judicial proceeding. Whenever a course aims at the subversion of any
Federal institution, or the corruption of its public officers, it is an offence against the
well-being of the United States; from its very nature it is cognizable under their
authority; and consequently it is within the jurisdiction of this court by virtue of the
sxth section of the Judicial Act."
See also Mr. Justice Radcliffe's opinion, WHARToN's STATE TRIALS, 6Sx; Chief justice Ellsworth's opinion, Charleston Gazette, May x6, 1799; OPINIoNs Or TuE Arzys.

GENERAL, Vol. s, 52, 71.
An account of these trials is given by F. M. Anderson, "Enforcement of the Alien
and Sedition Acts" in Annual Report of the American Historical Association (19t2)
pp. 118-119.
The doctrine laid down by Judge Peters was rejected by Judge Chase in the
Worrall case. The effect of this dissent is discussed by C. J. Davies, "Review of Dlu
Ponceaus Dissertation on the Nature and Extent of the Jurisdiction of the Courts of
the United States," NoaTH AmECAx REVIEW, XXI, (x825).
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United States, or to intimidate or prevent any person holding a
place or office in or under the Government of the United States,
from undertaking, performing or executing, his trust or duty;
and if any person or persons, with intent as aforesaid, shall
counsel, advise, or attempt to procure any insurrection, riot,
unlawful assembly or combination, whether such conspiracy,
threatening, counsel, advice, or attempt, shall have the proposed effect or not, he or they shall be deemed guilty of a high
misdemeanor, and, on conviction, before any court of the
United States, having jurisdiction thereof, shall be punished
by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars and by imprisonment during a term not less than six months, nor exceeding
five years, and further, at the discretion of the Court may be
holden to find sureties for his good behavior in such sum, and
for such fine, as the said court may direct."
Section II.--"And be it further enacted, that if any person
shall write, print, utter or publish, or shall cause or procure
to be written, printed, uttered or published, or shall knowingly
and wittingly assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering, or
publi*shing, any false, scandalous and malicious writing or
writings against the Government of the United States, or either
House of Congress of the United States, or the President of
the United States, with intent to defame the said Government,
or either ,House of the said Congress, or the said President,
or to bring them or either of them, into contempt or disrepute;
or to excite against them, or either of them, the hatred of the
good people of the United States, or to stir up sedition within
the United States; or to excite any unlawful combinations
therein, for opposing or resisting any law of the United States,
or any Act of the President of the United States, done in pursuance of any such law, or of the powers in him vested by the
Constitution of the United States, or to resist, oppose, or defeat
any such law or act; or to aid, encourage, or abet, any hostile
designs of any foreign nation against the United States, their
people or the Government, then such person s, being thereof
convicted, before any Court of the United States, having jurisdiction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two
thousand dollars and by imprisonment not exceeding two
years.
Section III.--"And be it further enacted, that if any person
shall be prosecuted, under this Act, for the writing or publishing any libel aforesaid, it shall be lawful for the defendant,
upon trial of the cause, to give in evidence, in his defence, the
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truth of the matter charged as a libel. And the jury, who shall
try the cause, shall have a right to determine the law and fact,
3
under the direction of the Court, as in other cases."
Section I of the Sedition Act was so clearly reasonable that its
passage met with no specific protest, but the other provisions of the
Act were not so well received. 4 The brief debates in Congress- and
.

3

The bill was introduced by Mr. Lloyd, June 26, 1798, ANNALs ST3HCONG., I, 590;
reported by Mr. Harper, ANNALS STH CoNo. I, 2116.
For statement of the law see I PET. STAT. AT L., 596, and ANNALS STU Coxo. InI,
3776-3777.
An attempt to strike out the words "by printing or writing" failed by a vote of
48-28.
A motion by Mr. Harper to insert a new section providing that "Nothing in this
law shall be construed to extend to abridge the freedom of speech and of the press, as
secured by the Constitution of the United States" was withdrawn. Probably such a
section would have operated only to throw doubts upon the constitutionaity of the act.
Sec. 3 was introduced by Mr. Bayard and Mr. Gallatin, ANNALS STH CoNo., II,
a277.
For other protective measures adopted at the same session of Congress see: ANNALS
STH CoNG., I1, 3739, 3744, 3776-3777.
It should be noted that the Sedition Act was intended to embody all the reforms
which had, up to that time, been made in the common law of libels. Sec. 3 shows the
influence of Fox's Libel Act and the arguments of Erskine.
4Protests were received from Suffolk and Queen counties, N. Y.; County of Eases
in N. 3.; Phila., York, Mifflin, Dauphin, Washington and Cumberland, Pa.; Amelia, in
Va. See ANNALS, STH CONO. III,,2985.
Typical of these was the "Address of the Va. Assembly to the People: "Measures
can mould governments, and if an uncontrolled power of construction is surrendered to
those who administer them, their progress may be easily foreseen and their end easily
foretold. A lover of monarchy, who opens the treasuries of corruption by distributing
emolument among devoted partisans, may at the same time be approaching his object
and deluding the people with professions of republicanism. He may confound monarchy
and republicanism, by the art of definition. He may varnish over the dexterity which
ambition never fails to display, with the pliancy of language, the seduction of expediency, or the prejudices of the times; and he may come at length to avow that so
extensive a territory as the United States can only be governed by the energies of
monarchy; that it. cannot be defended, except by standing armies; and that it cannot
be united except by consolidation.
"Measures have already been adopted which may lead to these consequences. They
consist"In destroying, by the Sedition Act, the responsibility of public servants and public
measures to the people, thus retrograding towards the exploded doctrine that the'administrators of the Government are the masters and not the servants of the people, and
exposing America, which acquired the honor of taking the lead among nations towards
perfecting political principles to the disgrace of returning first to the ancient ignorance
and barbarism"In restraining the freedom of the press and investing the executive "with legisWaRMNcs or
lative, executive and judicial powers, over a numerous body of men-JAMEs MADIsON [Hunt ed.] Vol. VI., PP. 338.339.
CONG.
That Sec. I was not complained of, See-Report of Committee, ANNALS, STH
oF JAMES
111, 3987. Madison, himself omits criticism of Section I. See, WaxTisTs
as "Madison's
MADISON [Hunt ed.], VI, 393. These volumes will be referred to hereafter
Writings."
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the more elaborate arguments of the Virginia legislative committee
reveal the following constitutional objections to the Act: i-That
the common law did not form a part of the law of the United
States, and an Act declaratory of the common law was not, therefore, necessarily constitutional. 2-That no authority over the
press was delegated to the Federal Government. 3-That any
iiwer over the press was positively denied to the Government by
the First Amendment. Let us consider these points in order.
I.
Was the common law in force in this country as a part of the law
of the United States? It would seem that the Congressional Committee on Petitions considered the common law to be in operation,
for they contended:
"That the Act in question cannot be unconstitutional, because it makes nothing penal that was not penal before, and
gives no new power to the Court, but is merely declaratory of
the common law, and useful for rendering that law more generally known, and more easily understood. This," they said,
"cannot be denied, if it be admitted, as it must he, that false,
scandalous and malicious libels against the Government of the
country, published with intent to do mischief, was punishable
by common law. * * * The Act, indeed, is so far from having
extended the law and the power of the Court that it has
abridged both, and has enlarged instead of abridging the liberty of the press; for at common law, libels against the Government might be punished with fine and imprisonment at the
discretion of the 'Court, whereas the Act limits the fine to two
thousand dollars, and imprisonment to two years; and it also
allows the party accused to give the truth in evidence for his
justification, which by common law, was expressly forbidden."8
The foundation for the position of the Committee was, of course,
the argument that the common law, not having been abrogated by
the Constitution, was still in force.
To this contention, Mr. Madison, in his report as chairman of the
Virginia legislature, made the following answer:
"In the States prior to the Revolution it is certain that the
MADISON'S WRITINGS, VI, 338.
ANNALS 5TH coNG., III, 2989.

See also Mr. Harper's speech, ANNALS

14z, and the reference to this argument in MADISON'S WRITINGS VI, 372.

TH CoNG.,
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common law, under different limitations, made a part of the
colonial codes. But whether it be understood that the original
colonists brought the law with them, or made it their law by
adoption, it is .equally certain that it was the separate law of
each colony within its respective limits, and was unknown to
them as a law pervading and operating through the whole as
one society.
"It could not possibly be otherwise. The common law was
not the same in any two of the colonies; in some the modifications were materially and extensively different. There was no
comfnon legislature by which a common will could be expressed in the form of law;*nor any common magistracy by
which such a law could be carried into practice. The will of
each colony, alone and separately, had its organs for these
purposes."
"Did then," asks Mr. Madison, "the principles or operation
of the great event which made the colonies independent States
imply or introduce the common law as a law of the Union?
"The fundamental principle of the Revolution was, that the
colonies were co-ordinate members with each other and with
Great Britain, of an empire united by a common executive
sovereign, but not by a common legislative sovereign * * *
"The assertion by Great Britain of a power to make laws
for the other members of the Empire in all cases whatsoever,
ended in the discovery that she had a right to make laws for
them in no cases whatsoever. Such being, the ground of out
Revolution, no support nor color can be drawn from it for the
doctrine that the common law is binding on these States as one
society. The doctrine on the contrary, is evidently repugnant
to the fundamental principle of the Revolution."
-An examiiation of the Articles of Confederation, 'Mr. Madison
thinks, will bear out this conclusion.
"In the interval between the commencement of the Revolution and the final ratification of these Articles," he writes,
"the nature and extent of the union was determined by the
circumstances of the crisis, rather than by any accurate deline-

ation of the general authority. It will not be alleged that the
'common law' could have had any legitimate birth as a law of
the United States during that state of things. If if came as
such into existence at all the charter of Confederation must

have been its parent.
"Here again its pretentions are absolutely destitute of foun-
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dation. This instrument' does not contain a sentence or syllable that can be tortured into a countenance of the idea that
the parties to it were, with respect to the objects of the common law, to form one community. No such law is named, or
implied, or alluded to, as being in force, or as brouglit into
force by that compact.
"Thus it appears that not a vestige of this extraordinary
doctrine can be found in the origin or progress of American
institutions. The evidence against it has, on the contrary,
grown stronger at every step, till it has amounted to a formal
and positive exclusion 7by written articles of compact among
the parties copcerned."
The historical treatment of the subject by Mr. Madison seems to
show conclusively that the common law did not form a part of the
law of 'the United States prior to the adoption of the Constitution.
If this is true, the assertion by the Federalists that the penalties of
the Sedition Act were a mitigation of those of common law is unfounded, unless it can be shown that the common law was adopted
by the Constitution. Let us now turn to a consideration of this
point.
I There are two passages of the Constitution which contain a description of the laws of the United States. The first is found in
Art. III, Section 2, and te second in Art. 6, Par. 2. Neither of
these passages makes any reference to the common law. The Committee of the Virginia Assembly, therefore, correctly said:
"If the common law had been understood to be a law of the
United States, it is not possible to assign a satisfactory reason
8
why it was not expressed in the enumeration."
Certain it is that the common law was not expressly declared to
be a part of the law of the United States, and, if it was adopted at
all by that instrument, it must have been by implication.
The clause most relied upon by those who held that the common
law was adopted by the Constitution was Art. III, Sec. 2, which
provides that "the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law
and equity arising under this Constitution, etc." During the debate on the petitions for the repeal of the Sedition Act, Mr. Otis, a
defender of the Act, asks:
. "What is intended by 'cases at law and equity arising under

I MADISON'S WRITINGS, VI. 373-376. See also Judge Chase's opinion in U. S. v.
Worrall, 2 Dallas; Charles Warren, HISTORY OF THE AmERICAN BAR, 229-239, and notes.
S"MADISON'S WRITINGS, VI, 378-379. The Virginia Committee, of course, took the
See MADISON'S WRITINGS, VI, 326.
Position that there were no implied powers.
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the Constitution,' as distinguished from 'Cases arising under
the laws of the United States?' What other law can be contemplated but common law; what sort of equity but that legal
discretion which has been executed in England from time immemorial, and is to be learned from books and reports of that
country ?"
The reply to this question was given by Mr. Madison, as follows:
"It has been asked, what cases distinct from those arising
under the laws and treaties of the United States can arise under
the Constitution other than those arising under the common law?
And it is inferred that the common law is accordingly adopted
and recognized by the Constitution. * * * If any color for the
inference can be found it must be in the impossibility of finding any other cases in law and equity, within the provisions of
the Constitution to satisfy the expression.
"The expression is fully satisfied and its accuracy justified
by two descriptions of cases to which the judicial authority is
extended, and neither of which implies that the common law
is the law of the United States. One of the restrictions comprehends the cases growing out of the restrictions on the legislative power of the states. * * * A second description comprehends suits between citizens and foreigners or citizens of different states or foreign law, but submitted by the Constitution
to the judicial power of the United States, the judicial power
being in several instances extended beyond the legislative
power of the United States."
"To this explanation of the text," continues Mr. Madison,
"the following observations may be added.
"The expression 'cases in law and equity' is manifestly confined to cases of civil nature and would exclude cases of criminal jurisdiction. Criminal cases in law and equity, would be
a language unknown to the law.
"The succeeding paragraphs of the same section is in harmony with this construction. It is in these words: 'In all
cases affecting Ambassadors or other public ministers and
consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction.' In all the other
cases (including cases of law and equity arising under the
Constitution) the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact; with such exceptions and under
such regulations as Congress shall make.
9AXNALS

5TH cONG., ir,

2147.
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"This paragraph by expressly giving an appellate jurisdiction in cases of law and equity arising under the Constitution
to fact as well as to law, dearly excludes criminal cases when
trial by jury ig secured, because the fact in such cases is not a
subject of appeal.
"Once more, * * * the judicial power of the United States
cannot be construed to extend to any suit in law and equity
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
a citizen of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any
foreign power. As it will not be pretended that any criminal
proceeding could take place against a State, the terms 'law and
equity' must be understood as appropriate to civil in exclusion
of criminal cases.
"From these considerations it is evident that this part of the
Constitution, even if it could be applied at all to the purpose
for which it has b~en cited, would not include any case whatever of a criminal nature, and consequently would not authorize the inference frorh it that judicial authority extends to offenses against the common law as offenses arising under the
Constitution. 1
On the main point Mr. Madison's contentions are today well
established." No prosecutions can take place in the United States
without an express statute on the subject, nor is the common law
the measure of the powers of the Federal Government except in
those cases where common law terms are used in defining those
powers. Our next inquiry must be, therefore, whether the original
Constitution gave Congress any power of legislating with respect
to the press.
II.
In the first place, it is admitted that no express power over the
press was delegated to the Federal Government. ' Furthermore, it
was asserted that the understanding of the members of the Convention was complete on the subject, and that it was never intended
12
that Congress should control the press, an assertion that seems to
be partially substantiated by Hamilton's declaration that "no power
MADISON'S WZTINGS, VII, 376-378. Mr. Gallatin thought that "these cases meant
only, either such as might arise from any doubtful construction of the constitution * * *
or those arising immediately under any specific power given or prohibition enjoined by
the Constitution." ANNALs 5TH CONG. II, 2157.
11U. S. v. Goodu'in, 7 Cranch. 32. See also Charles Warren, HxsTORY or AUTiICAN BAR, 229-239.
2Mr.

Nicholas of Virginia, AsNrALs, 5TH CONG.
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'
was given by which restrictions upon the press could be imposed."
But the intention of the Constitution to exclude any special control
over the press from the powers of Congress still leaves open the
question whethler or not Congress can control the press by legislation designed primarily to carry into execution the powers expressly delegated to it.
In attempting to prove that the authority over the press which
'was exercised by Congress in passing the Sedition Act was within
its Constitutional power, it'was first argued that the right of self
preservation is inherent in every government. Judge Chase puts
the case thus:
"All governments which I have read or haeard of punish libels
against themselves. If a man attempts to destroy the confidence of the people in their officers, their -supreme magistrates,
and their legislatures, he effectually saps the foundations of the
government ** *1,
The same view, somewhat differently expressed, was urged by
the Committee on Petitions. While they believed
"that each of the measures adopted by Congress was susceptible of an analytical justification in the principles of the Cbnstitution and national policy," yet they preferred "to rest their
vindication on the true ground of consideriig them parts of a
general system of defense, adapted to a crisis of extraDrdinary
difficulty and danger.
"The Alien and Sedition Act," they continued, "form a part
and protective
and * * * an essential part, in the precautionary
15
measures, adopted for our security."

The argument of the Committee cannot be validly based on any
one clause of the Constitution. So far as any phrases of the Constitution were taken to support their view, it was those which refer
to the "defence and general welfare." We may follow the example
of the Virginia Legislative Committee, however, in "wasting but
little time in'the attempt to cover the Act by the preamble to the
Constitution, it being contrary to every acknowledged rule of construction to set up this part of an instrument in opposition to the
plain meaning expressed in the body of the instrument." The preamble, as 'Mr. Madison states, "usually contains the general moISF-3

sr 84, [Lodge ed.] 537-538.

u U. S. v. Cooper, WiHmow's "STATz TIALS' 67o-67!.
See also ibid 11, 2146; and i d, 2x67.
=AxNALs, STH CONC., lal, 2990-2991.

A

similar position was taken by the minority of the Virginia Committee. See their report,
p. ix ff., quoted in part in the brief of the Govt. in the Debi Cae, pp. 12-x6.
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tives or reasons for the particular regulations or measures which
follow it, and it is always understood to be explained and limited
by them. We may also agree that Art. I, Sec. 8, "in its fine and
consistent meaning could not enlarge the eriumerated powers vested
in Congress. 1
On the other hand the question, raised by Judge Chase, whether
the Government of the United States has a self preservative power
is not so easily disposed of. Whether or not such a construction
was originally put upon the Constitution, the doctrine has been subsequently developed that the power of the Government "includes
the rights and duties and obligations growing out of the Constitution
itself, our international relations, and all the protection implied by
the nature of the government under the Constitution ;,'7 while in
the Fong Yue Ting Case, the Court specially recognizes the power
of expelling, aliens as "an inherent and inalienable right of every
sovereign and independent nation, essential to its safety, its independence and its welfare."1 s
A strong dissent was voiced in the latter case by Justice Brewer,
as follows:
"It is said that the power here asserted is inherent in sovereignty. This doctrine is one both indefinite and dangerous.
Where are the limits to such powers to be found, and by whom
-are they to be pronounced? Is it within legislative capacity to
declare the limits? If so, then the mere assertion of an inherent power creates it, and despotism exists. May the
Courts establish the boundaries? Whence do they obtain the
authority for this? Shall they look to the practices of other
nations to ascertain the limits? The governments of other
nations have elastic powers-ours is fixed and bounded by a
written Constitution.' 9
Nevertheless the majority of the Supreme Court sanctioned the
view, earlier advanced by Judge Chase, that the power of self-preservation is inherent in the -Government, and that Congress may, in
certain cases, pass laws for the preservation of the Government
without regard to any express provision of the Constitution from
which such power is derived. 20 The question in each case is, accord-

16M.iSO

e'S WRITINGS V1, 382-383.
re 1'Jeagle Ax889), 131; U. S. 199, 34 L. ed. 71.
27Th
1
4Fonp Yue Ting v. U. S. (1892), 149 U. S. 71x, 37 L. ed. 912.
v.

See also Kohl

U. S. (1875), 91 U. S. 367.
" 149 U. S. 737. 37 L. ed. 921.

20 See, however, Justice Brewer's opinion, Fong Yue Ting Case.
ion in Kansas v. Colorado (x9o7), 2o6 U. S. 46.

Compare his opin-
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ing to Justice Gray, "whether the manner in which Congress has
exercised this right is consistent with the Constitution." 21 It must
be admitted that this test leaves the matter very much in the vague.
Yet whether we consider that Congress is vested with authority
over the press by some special clause of the Constitution or that
Congress has an implied power to pass such laws as are necessary
for the preservation of the Government, its power undoubtedly must
be considered in connection with Art. I, Sec. 8, par. i8 of the Constitution, 22 which provides that "Congress shall have the power to
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution the foregoing powers and all other powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
department or officer thereof."
The Federalist view of the interpretation of this clause is expressed by Judge Iredell as follows:
"What is necessary and proper, in regard to any particular
subject, cannot before an occasion arises be logically defined;
but must depend upon various extensive views of the case,
which no human foresight can reach. What is necessary and
proper in a time of confusion and general disorder, would not,
perhaps, be necessary and proper in a time of tranquility and
order. These are considerations of policy, and questions of
law, and upon which the legislature is bound to decide according to its real opinion of the necessity and propriety of an act
particularly in contemplation. It is, however alleged that the
necessity and propriety of passing collateral laws for the support of others, is confined to cases where the powers are
delegated, and is not extended to cases which have a reference
to general danger only. The words are general. If, therefore,
there be anything necessary and proper for carrying into execu2' 3
tion any or all of those powers, I presume it is constitutional.
Somewhat more specifically the Committee contended
"that a law to punish false, scandalous and malicious writings
against the Government, with intent to stir up sedition is a law
necessary for carrying into effect the powers vested by the
Constitution in the Government of the United States, and in
the departments and officers thereof, and consequently such a
law as Congress may pass, because the direct tendency of such
writings is to obstruct the acts of the Government by exciting
21

Fong Yue Ting v. U. S., op cit.

U. S., Art. I, Sec 8, par. I&
2 Northampton Insurgents Case, WHARTON, STATz TIALS, 479.
32 CONSTITUTION OF
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opposition to them, to endanger its existence by rendering it
odious and contemptible in the eyes of the people, and to produce seditious combinations against the laws, the power to
punish which has never been .questioned; because it would be
manifestly absurd to suppose that a Government might suppress sedition and yet be void of power to prevent it by punishing those acts which plainly and necessarily tend to it; and
because under the general power to make all laws necessary and
proper, Congress has passed too many laws for which no express provision can be found in the Constitution, and the constitutionality of which has never been questioned ** *,2"
A contrary view of the general import of the necessary and proper
clause is given by Mr. Madison, who argues that
"the plain import of this clause is that Congress shall have all
the incidental or instrumental power necessary and proper for
carrying into execution all the express powers * * *
"It is not," he says, "a grant of new powers to Congress, but
merely a declaration, for the removal of all uncertainty that
the means of carrying into execution those otherwise granted
are included in the grant."
"When therefore a question arises concerning the constitutionality of a particular power," Mr. Madison continues, "the
first question is, whether the power be expressed in the Constitution. If it be, the question is decided. If it be not expressed,
the next inquiry must be, whether it is properly an incident tq
an expressed power, and necessary for its execution. If it be,
it may be exercised by Congress. If it be not, Congress cannot
exercise it."2
Referring more directly to the argument made by the Committee
that the Sedition Law was necessary to enable the Government to
carry its power into execution, Mr. Madison continues:
"Is there any express power for executing which this is a
necessary and proper power?
"The power which has been selected as the least remote, in
answer to this question, is that of 'suppressing insurrections,'
which is made to imply a power to prevent insurrections by
punishing whatever may lead or tend to them. But it surely
cannot, with the least plausibility be said that the regulation of
the press, and a punishment of libels, are exercises of a power
2Axx...s ST CoN., Irl, 2988. See also Mr. Otis' Speech, iidd, II, 2146.
ILwzsoi's WmtzNGs, V1, 383.
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to suppress insurrections. The most that could be said would
be that the punishment of libels, if it had the tendency ascribed
to.it, might prevent the occasion of passing or executing laws
necessary and proper for the suppression of insurrections * * *
if the power to punish includes a power to prevent, by all the
means that have that tendency, such is the relation and inthat a
fluence among the most remote subjects of legislation,
26
all."
over
power over a very few would carry a power
The opinions which we have just reviewed present the Federalist
and Republican views respectively of the necessary and proper
clause. The discretion of Congress as to the means by which its
constitutional powers are to be executed is no longer questioned.
Judge Iredell's view of the "necessary and proper" clause, broad as
it is, is in substantial accord with Marshall's decision in McCulloch
v. Maryland, where that jurist takes the position that the clause
"purports to be an additional power, not a restriction on those already granted." "Let the end be legitimate," he says, "let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the Constitution are constitutional."ff
Also it seems clear, in light of recent judicial decisions, that Mr.
Madison's view that legislation must be attached to a particular
clause of the Constitution in order to be constitutional, is erroneous.
In Juillardv. Greenman (Iio U. S. 421), the Court clearly recognizes that a particular power may be found to be vested in Congress "by a just and fair interpretation of the whole Constitution."
Since Congress, then, is allowed a broad discretion in the choice
of means by which its powers are to be carried into execution, and
since such legislation may be based upon the whole Constitution
rather than upon any specific clause of that instrument, it is not
apparent that there is any proof that the press was given special
protection by the original Constitution. We may say, therefore,
that Congress was not without power to make laws touching the
press, unless such legislation was prohibited by some clause in the
Constitution.
III.
It is generally contended, however, that a different status was
given to the press by the First, Amendment, which provides that
"Congress shall make no.law*** abridging the freedom of speech
"Ibid, 383, 384. See also Mr. Nicholas' remarks.
3005.
•4 WXARTON'S STATE TRILS 3X6.

AirxAxs 5tE Conio.. III, 3oo4
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or of the press." Thus Mr. Madison contended that the First
Amendment was a positive denial to Congress of any power whatsoever over the press.
"This," he said, "was demonstrated by 'the great apprehension expressed by many when the Constitution was under consideration lest the omission of some positive exception, from
the powers delegated, of certain rights, and of the freedom of
the press particularly, might expose them to the danger of
being drawn, by construction, within some of the powers vested
in Congress, more especially of the power to make all laws
necessary and proper for carrying their other powers into execution." "In reply to this objection," continues Mr. Madison,
"it was invariably urged to be a fundamental and characteristic
principle of the Constitution, that all powers not given by it
were reserved, that no powers were given beyond those enumerated in -the Constitution and such as were fairly incident
to them; and the power over the rights in question, and particularly over the press was, neither among the enumerated
powers, nor incident to any of them; and consequently that an
exercise of any such power would be manifest usurpation."
"Is then," asks Mr. Madison, "the Federal Government
destitute of every authority for restraining the licentiousness of
the press, and for shielding itself against the libellous attacks
which may be made upon those who administer it?
"The Constitution alone," he says, "can answer the question.
If no such power be expressly delegated, and if it be not both
necessary and proper to carry into execution an express power
-above al, if it be expressly forbidden by a declaratory amendthat the Federal
ment to the Constitution-the answer must be
28
Government is destitute of such authority."
Mr. ,Madison's argument proves that the members of the convention were agreed that no special authority over the press was granted
to Congress by the Constitution; but the answer to the question
whether Congress is destitute of all power over the press is inconclusive, for there might be certain cases in which it would be both
necessary and proper for Congress to regulate the press. The
question, then, remains whether the Amendment amounts to a positive denial to Congress of any power over the press. The controversy-on the subject has centered around the meaning of the terms
"abridge" and "freedom of the press" respectively.
= MADISON'S WRITINGS, VI, 390-392.

See also Mr. Nicholas' speech, ANNA.s

5Tr

For the events that led to the adoption of the First Amendment. see
M'.osso'es WRITINGs, VI, 390-391.

CONG.

II.
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The argument by which the Federalists sought to prove that
(i)
Congress was not forbidden to legislate in regard to the press was
stated by the Committee on Petitions as follows:
"Had the Constitution intended to prohibit 'Congress from
legislating at all on the subject of the press * * *, it would have
used the same expression as in that part of the clause which
relates to religion and religious tests; whereas the words are
wholly different 'Congress,' says the Constitution * * * 'shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom
of speech or of the press.' Here it is manifest that the Constitution intended to prohibit Congress from legislating at all
on the subject of religious establishments, and the prohibition
is made in the most express terms. Had the same intention
prevailed respecting the press, the same expressions would
have been used, and Congress would have been 'prohibited
from passing any law respecting the press.' They are not,
however, prohibited from legislating at all on the subject, but
merely from 'abridging' the liberty of the press. It is evident
that they may legislate respecting the press, may pass laws for
its regulation, and to punish those who pervert it into an engine
29
of mischief, provided those laws do not abridge its liberty."
Mr. Madison, on the other hand, considered that:
"Both these rights, the liberty of conscience and of the
press, rest equally on the original ground of not 'being delegated by the Constitution, and consequently withheld from
the Government. Any construction, therefore, that would
attack the original security for the one must have a like effect
for the other.
"Secondly," he continued, "they are both secured by the
supplement to the Constitution, being both included in the
same amendment, made at the same time, and by the sahne
authority. Any construction or argument, then, which would
turn the amendment into a grant or acknowledgment of power
with respect to the press might 'be equally applied to the freedom of religion."
Lastly, Mr. Madison argues that,
"if the words and phrases in the amendment are to be con29ANNxALs .TH CONG.. MII.2ogo. See also the report of the minority of the Virginia
Committee P. xi ff. This document may be found in the Library of Congress catalogued
"Cla E. 327. Book A. 22."
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sidered as chosen with a studied discrimination which yields
an argument for a power over the press made under the limitations that its freedom be not abridged, the same argument
results from the same consideration for a power over the
exercise of religion, under the limitation that its freedom
be not prohibited.
"For," he says, "if Congress may regulate the freedom of
the' press, provided they do not abridge it, because it is said
only, 'they shall not abridge it,' and it is. not said, 'they shall
make no law respecting it,' the analogy of reasoning is conclusive that Congress may regulate and even abridge the free
exercise of religion, provided they do not prohibit it, because
it is not said
it is said only, 'they shall not prohibit it,' and
30
it."
respecting
law
no
make
shall
that they

We have already conceded Mr. Madison's point that no express
power over the press or religion was delegated to Congress. His
other points, however, rest upon the assumption that the amendment was considered to be "a grant or recognition of power." The
Committee made no such claim, but admitted that limitations upon
the power of Congress were imposed by the amendment. The only
*question was whether the limitations were the same in regard to
religion and the press, and the answer to the question the Committee
found in the different terms used with respect to these subjects.
That: their conclusion was at least partially correct is borne out by
Mr. Madison's silence with regard to Section I of the Sedition Act,
which likewise imposed restrictions upon the press. The conclusion must be that some power over the press can be exercised constitutionally by Congress.
What then was the limit of the Congressional power over the
press? The Committee thought a "well-known and universally
admitted definition" of the liberty of the press would give the
proper answer to the question.
"The liberty of the press," said Mr. Blackstone, "consists
in laying no previous restraint upon publications, and not in
freedom from censure for criminal matter when published."
"Every freeman," he says, "has an undoubted right to lay
' MDsob's WRITINGS, VI. P. 400-401. Mr. Nicholas argued that the phraseology
of the amendment showed that Congress was prohibited from legislating at all on the
subject mentioned in the amendment. He accounted for the deficient language by saying
that "The writer intended to indulge his copiousness of expression." AxNrALs 5TH
Coxo., 1I, 30!. See also Gallatin's speech, ibid., I, 2x6o-2x6x; Mr. Madison's speech,
ibid., 21o5.
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what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this
is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he published
what is unlawful, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the
consequences of his own temerity. To punish (as the law
does at present) any dangerous or offensive writings, which,
when published, shall, upon fair and impartial trial, be adjudged of a pernicious tendency, is'hecessary for the preservation of the peace and good order of government and religion, the only foundation of civil liberty..
"Thus," continues the writer, "the will of the individual is
still left free; the abuse only of that free will is the object
of legal punishments: neither is any restraint hereby laid
upon freedom of thought or inquiry; liberty of private sentiment is still left; the disseminating or making public of bad
sentiments destructive of society is the crime which society
corrects. A man (says a fine writer on this subject) may
be allowed to keep poisons in his closet, but not publicly
vend them as cordials; and to this 'may be added, that the
only plausible argument heretofore made for the restraining
the just freedom of the press, 'that it is necessary to prevent
the daily abuse of it, will entirely lose its force when it is
shown (by a reasonable exertion of the laws) that the press
cannot be abused to any bad purpose without incurring a suitable punishment; whereas, it can never be used to any good
one when under the control of the inspection, so true will
it be found that to censure the licentiousness is to maintain
the liberty of the press."$1
It seems that Blackstone here lays down two characteristics of
the "freedom of the press": exemption from "previous restraints"
on all publications and an exemption from "subsequent punishment" for publications which, "upon fair and impartial trial," are
' CHASE&BLACKSTOKE. 917-918.
State Trials. 77.

For a similar construction see Rex v. Cuthill, 27

other bases are cited in ROGERS' POSTAL PowERs OF CONGRESS. pp. Q8 a

and Zacbariah Chafee. "Freedom of Speech in War Time" 3z HARv. L. REv. 932 ff.
For a criticism of Blacktone's definition see THEODORE SCHROEDER. "CoONSTITUTIONAL
FRE. SPEECH DEFINEn AND DEFENDED.' Chap. VIIT. and Chafee. nP. cit., o8-94x.

The Congressional Committee argued "that the liberty of the press did never extend
according to the laws of any state or the United States, or of England, from whence
our laws are derived, to the publication of false, scandalous, and malicious writings
against the Government, written with intent to do mischief, such publications being
unlawful, and punishable in every state; from whence it follows, undeniably, that a
law to punish seditious and malicious publications, is not an abridgment of the liberty
of the press, for it would be a. manifest absurdity to say, that a man's liberty was
abridged by punishing him for doing that which he never had a liberty to do." ANNALS
STH CONG. II, 2989.
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adjudged not to be "of a pernicious tendency." If these are the
took
true tests of the freedom of the press, Mr. Harper correctly
be
not
would
press
the
of
liberty
rational
"the
the position.that
trial
fair
a
restricted by a well-defined law, provided pdrsons.have
by jury.; * * *-2
But was the Blackstonian theory accepted at the time of the adopMr.
tion of the First Amendment? In order to show that it was,
demonstrate,
would
He
States.
the
in
meaning
its
to
Otis had resort
he asserted, that
"although, in several States' constitutions, the liberty of the
press and speech were guarded by the most express and unequivocal language, the legislators and judicial departments
of those States had adopted the definitions of the English
law, and had provided for the punishment of defamatory
and seditious libels. Thus, the Bill of Rights of the State of
New Hampshire declared 'That liberty of the press is essential to the security of freedom in a State; it ought, therefore, to be inviolably preserved.' Yet by an act passed inFebruary, i79i, subsequent to the adoption of that Constitution, 'any person of the age of fourteen or upwards, making
and publishing a lie or libel tending to the defamation of any
person, is liable, on conviction, to a fine,' etc. So, too, the
* Declaration of Rights prefixed to the Constitution of Massachusetts contained an article to the same effect as that of
New Hampshire. Yet in the law establishing the Supreme
Court of that State cognizance was given it, among other
things, over all offenses and misdemeanors of a public nature, 'tending to a breach of the peace, oppression of the subject, raising of faction, controversy or debate, to any manner of misgovernment'; while, by another law, any person
aiding or abetting a lottery by printing or publishing a scheme
.or account of it, was liable to punishment; by a third, 'if any
person, by public or private discourse or conversation, or by
any way or means, should dissuade or endeavor to prevent
an officer from doing his duty in quelling riots,' he was subject to a heavy penalty. In Pennsylvania they carried matters even further. In their Bill of Rights we find 'that the
printing presses shall be free to any person who undertakes
to examine the proceedings of the legislature, or any branch
jury was compen ANNALs 5TH CONG. 11, 2102. Mr. Otis thought "that an honest
that they could decide
tent to such a discrimination (between liberty and licentiousness),
5TH CONG. I, 2149.
upon the falsehood and malice of the intention.'-ANALs
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of the Government, and no law shall ever be made to restrain
the free right thereof.' The free communication of thoughts
and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man, and
every citizen may freely write, print, or speak on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.' Yet
in this same Pennsylvania 'a law was made, and we have
heard from the best authority was still in force, making it
high treason to propose a new Constitution in that State."'
"If we go to Virginia," Mr. Otis continued, "we shall read
in their Constitution 'that the freedom of the press cannot
be restrained except in despotic Governments,' but in the
act passed December, 1792, it is provided 'that if any person shall, by writing or speaking, endeavor to instigate the
people to erect or establish any Government separate or independent of the Government of Virginia, he shall be subject
to any punishment, not extending to life or member, which
the court may adjudge.' Also they have there an act 'against
cursing and swearing, which is merely using the liberty of
speech.' ,,33

It has been argued subsequently that Blackstone's definition of
freedom of the press had received such judicial sanction that its
significance must have been familiar to the members of the legislatures which adopted the amendment. In must have been known,
for instance, that Chief Justice Hutchinson, of Massachusetts
(1767)," and Judge McKean in Pennsylvania (1788)35 had

=ANsNALS STH CONG. II. 2149. See also COOLEY, CONSTITUTIOmAL LIMITATIONS, [7th
ed.1 6o-6o4 n.
That Pennsylvania had such a law as Mr. Otis here describes is improbable. Mr.
Gallatin specifically denied that the assertion was true. The reference to the Virginia
law is also misleading. The law referred to penalized the establishment of a government in Virginia by unconstitutional methods. The law was only a re-enactment of
the law of x78.

See HzNiNG, LAws or VA..

12. PP. 41-4.1and SHEPzsaD "LAwS

or

VA.". I. V. 187.

" Chief justice Hutchinson had spoken as follows: "High Notions of the Liberty
of the Press, I am sensible, have prevailed of late among us; but it is dangerous to
meddle with and strike at this Court.

means
"The Liberty of the Press is doubtless a very great Blessing; but this Liberty
License.-no more than a Freedom for everything to pass from the Press without a
before the
That is, you shall not be obliged to obtain a License from any Authority
to mean a
Emission of things from the Press. Unlicensed Printing was never thought
with impunity, all
Liberty of reviling and caluminating all Ranks and Degrees of Men

Liberty of the Press to tte
Authority with ignominy.-To carry this absurd notion of the
print everything that is Libellous and slanderous-is3
length some would have it-to
Quincy Mass. Reports, 244.
truly astonishing and of a most dangerous tendency."

Win. Cabbett,
s'Respublica v. Oswald, x Dall. (N.S.) 319, 325. See also trial of
3 JOhns. Cases, 337(Pa., 1797) WHARTON'S STATE TRIALS, 322, 323; PeoPle V. Croswell,

411.
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adopted this definition of the liberty of the press, Nor is
it evident that such judicial precedents were regarded as overthrown
by the First Amendment.

Thus, in 1794 and again in 1797, the

Attorney General had expressed opinions which were in harmony
with themY8 Also, Blackstone's theory was consistently held by
the Federal courts in enforcing the Sedition Act.
The evidence is certainly strong that the First Amendment was
designed prinarily to prevent the imposition of previous restraint
How did the oppontets of the Sedition Act
upon the pres
Madison argued (i) that the practice in the
it?
meet
to
endeavor
States was not consistent with the Blackstonian theory, (2) that the
nature of our Government requires a greater freedom of the press
than was allowed in England, and that this freedom could not be
enjoyed if the power of the Federal Government were as extensive
-as that of the English Government under the common law. Let us
examine these arguments briefly.
(i) The theory of the freedom of the press drawn by Mr. Madison from the practice in the States was different from that stated
by Mr. Otis.
"In every state, probably, in the Union," he says, "the
press has exercised a freedom in canvassing the merits of
measures and ptdblic men of every description which has not
been confined to the strict limits of the common law. On
this footing the freedom of the press has stood; on this footing it yet stands. ' 37
(2) Moreover, Mr. Madison argues, the Blackstonian theory is
inconsistent with the very nature of our Government.
OpINIoNs or ATry. GENZERAL,52, 71.
The
3 MADISON'S WRITINGS, VI, 386. See also ANNALs 5TH CONG., II, 2s1g-az6o.
fears aroused by the exercise of such power are reflected in the following: Speech of
36 1

Mr. Nicholas, ANNALS .5TH CONG., II. 21041 argument of Va. Committee. MADISON'S

*WRITxrs. VI. 135. See also CooLEY. CONSTiruTioNAL LIMITATIONS, E7th ed.1 603-6o4.
Mr. Nicholas contended "that there are some acts of the press which Congress
ought not to have the power to restrain, and that by the amendment they are prohibited
to restrain these acts. Now to justify any acts of Congress, they ought to show the

boundary between what is prohibited and what is permitted, and that the act is not
within the prohibited class. The Constitution has fixed no such boundary, therefore
they can pretend to no power over the press, without claiming the right of defining
what is freedom, and what is licentiousness, and that would be to claim a right which
would defeat the Constitution; for cvcery Congress would have the same right and the
freedom of the press would fluctuate according to the will of the Legislature. This is,
therefore, only a new mode of claiming absolute power over the press." ANNALS 5TE
See also II, 2142. For an
See also his speeches ibid., II, 2140.
CONG.,, III, 3o1.
intimation as to the proper limit of the Government's power in such cases see U. S. v.
Reynolds, 98 U. S. 145.
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"The nature of governments, elective and limited, and responsible in all their branches," he says, "may well be supposed to require a greater freedom of animadversion than
might be tolerated by the genius of such a government as
that of Great Britain. In the latter, it is a maxim that the
king, an hereditary and not a responsible magistrate, can do
no wrong, and that the legislature, which in two-thirds of its
composition is also hereditary and not responsible, can do
what it pleases. In limited States the executive magistrates are not held to be infallible nor the legislature to be
omnipotent; and both being elective, are both responsible.
Is it not natural and necessary, under such circumstances,
that a different degree of freedom in the use of the press
should be contemplated?""a
Such a freedom Mr. Nicholas also thought could not be secure
from the arbitrary interference of the Federal Government if the
Blackstonian theory of the freedom of the press was adhered to;
for, he says, "it does not at all distinguish between publications of
various sorts, but leaves all to the regulation of the law, only forbidding government to interfere until the publication is really made.
The definition, if true;" he proceeds, "so reduces the effect of the
amendment that the power of Congress is left unlimited over the
39
press, and they are merely deprived of one mode of restraint."
It was further contended by Mr. Madison that, in effect, not even
one mode of restraint of the press, namely, that the censorship, was
denied to Congress, for "a law imposing penalties on printed publications would have similar effect with a law authorizing a previous restraint on them. It would seem a mockery to say that laws
might not be passed preventing publications from being made, but
laws might be passed for punishing them in case they should
tt
be made."40
87-388. See also Mr. Nicholas' speech. ANNALS STH
5 MADISON'S WtTTNGS VI.
CoNG., I1, 3009; 2 STEPHEN'S HISTORY o, CaiMiNAL LAW, 300; Henry Schofield, "Freedom
of the Prem." in 9 PRoc. Am. SOCIAL Soc. 70: Ds TOCQUEVLLE. DzsocRAcy TN AmERiCA,
[Reeve Translation] p. 178. Contra, see Iredell 3. in Northampton Insurgents Case,
WHARTON'S STATE TiIALS, 477.
III, 3008.
"9ANNALS STH COONG.,
"MADIsoN'S WRITINGS VI. 388.
Mr. Madison's assertion has received authoritative support from Cooley, who says
that "their purpose (of the free speech clauses) has evidently been to protect parties
in the free publication of matters of public concern, to secure their right to a free
discussion of public events and public measures, and to enable every citizen at any
time to bring the government and any person in authority to the bar of public opinion
by any just criticism upon their conduct in the exercise of the authority which the
people have conferred upon them. * * * The evils to be prevented were not the censor-
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On both of these points later history has gone far to vindicate
Madison's position, but at that time it had little to support it except
his own connection with the subject.
The Republicans, however, were not willing to concede that the
freedom of speech in the States was the same as its liberty under
the National Government. Thus, Mr. Nicholas "had heard it said
that the States take cognizance of offenses of this sort (seditious
libels)." "But," he asks, "does this give the power to the Federal
Government? Because the States declare certain things offenses
have the general Government power over like offenses? If so,"
he said, "it would have a concurrent power with the' State Governments, which," he believed, "would be a novel idea.""
It seems that Mr. Nicholas misses the point of the Federalist
argument. Anyone would agree that the powers of the Federal
Government are not, in every case, coextensive with those of the
States. In this case the argument that Blackstone's definition was
generally accepted was made only in order to show that the First
Amendment did not remove the press entirely from congressional
control; and such was not intended, whether we adopt Blackstone's
definition of the freedom of the. press or that of Madison; for
neither definition can be so construed as to amount to a domplete
idenial of power to Congress on the subject of the press, under the
"necessary and proper" clause
What then is the true limit of the National Government's power
over speech and the press? This power being "vested in and derived
from the people," and the Government having been "instituted for
2
the benefit of the people,"' it follows that the people have a right
to suppress such speech as interferes with the carrying out of the
purposes for which Government was established. The people,
therefore, acting through the Government, may constitutionally
penalize such speech as directly interferes with the constitutional
exercise of its powers by the Government. Such, it would seem,
ship of the press merely, but any action of the government by which it might prevent
.uch free and general discussion of public measures as seems absolutely essential to
prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens."
It must be remembered, however, that Cooley wrote long after the time of Madison,
and his opinion may represent a more liberal view than that which prevailed during
the Federalist period. There were, however, in the Federalist period, liberals who took
a position similar to Cooley's. See, for example, Gallatin's speeches, ANNALS 5TH CONG.,
II, 2io8, 21622163; Mr. Nicholas' speech, ibid., III, 3oo5-3oo6; Ebenezer Rhoades
Editor Chronicle (BucINGHsAMs RzmxitiscENcs, I, a6x); Mr. Cooper, Cooper Case,
WHARTON'S STATE TRIALS, 665; Mr. Madison, MADISON'S WRITINOS, VI, 336-337; ibid.,
396-398.

'1AxNAzs 5TH CoNG., II, 2143.
"ANNALS

I CONG., I, 451.
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is the extent of the Government's power today, which power has
43
Constitution.
been the same ever since the adoption of the original
In short, the First Amendment amounts only to recognition of rights
already 4existent, and so does not subtract from power previously
granted."

IV. Returning, then, to a direct consideration of the Sedition Act, it
would seem that Section II of that act was constitutional, if it did

no more than to protect the officers of Government from such false
and malicious verbal attacks as might render them incapable of performing their duties as public servants. Again, since the truth
could 'be given in evidence, it would seem that theoretically there
was no violation of the freedom of discussion, even according to
Madison's definition.
Madison, however, objected to this conclusion as follows:
"A few reflections," he contended, "will prove that its (the
Sedition Act's) baneful tendency is little diminished by the
privilege of giving in evidence the truth of the matter con43 G. P. Garrett, "Free Speech and the Espionage Act," in the JOURNAL oF CRIMINAL
LAW AND CRsIMINoLOGr, Vol. X, p. 7i, takes the position that the constitutional 'guaranty
is "that we shall be secure in freedom to use such speech as does not injure the rest of
the community. Interpreted by the Espionage Act," he says, "certain language and
o Therecertain expressions are. at this time, injurious to the nation and its people. *
fore, they are inhibited."
"See Brushaber v. Union Poc. Ry. Co., 240 U. S. a.
Mr. Madison himself seems to think that the power of the Government has never
extended to an abridgment of the freedom of the press. See MADISoN's WRITINGS,
Vol. VI, 398-400. While Mr. Madison's argument may be criticized on the ground that
his definition of the freedom of the press is too broad, yet we may accept the view that
the freedom of the press has been the same since the adoption of the Constitution; for
the power of the Government has been restricted so that it cannot pass arbitrary laws
for the sole purpose of controlling the press. See Robertson v. Baldwin, x65 U. S. 275281.
W. R. Vance, "Freedom of Speech and of the Press," 2 MIs. L. REv. 239 (1918),
shows that the Ametidment was intended to Secure the people in the rights which belonged to them under the common law. A similar position is taken by Fred G. Hart 'in
Yxz LAW JouRNAL, February, 192o. Neither of these writers, however, contends that
by common law the freedom of the press consists only in the absence of previous restraint. By the common law certain kinds of utterances were penalized; and, in passing
laws to carry its power into execution, Congress cannot go beyond the limits of the
common law. It is submitted that Congress is so limited by the "necessary and proper"
clause of the Constitution that it has never been able to infringe the common law right
of free speech, even had there been no constitutional amendment on the subject.
For a criticism of the idea that the freedom of the press consists only in the absence 6f previous restraint, see MADISON'S WRITINGS, VI, 386-387.
Zachariah Chafee, 32 HARv. L. REY. 959, takes the position that the proper boundaries
of free speech are to be determined in every instance by balancing the interests of the
individual and the interests of society, (A not very helpful suggestion practically).
See also John Chipman Gray. NATURE AND SOURCES OF TEE LAW, p. 48 ff.
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tamined in political writings. In the first place, when simple
and naked facts alone are in question, there is sufficient difficulty in some cases, and sufficient trouble and exertion in
all, of meeting a prosecution from the Government with the

full and formal proof necessary in a court of law.
"But in the next place, it must be obvious to the plainest
minds that opinions and inferences and conjectural observations are not only in many cases inseparable from facts,
but- may often 'be more the objects of the prosecution than
the facts themselves; or may even 'be altogether abstracted
from particular facts; and that opinion, and inferences, and
of
conjectural observations cannot be subject to that 4kind
5
proof which appertains to facts before a court of law.
"Again, it is no less obvious that the intent to defame or
bring into contempt, or disrepute, or hatred * * * cannot prevent its pernicious influence on the freedom of the press.
For, omitting the inquiry how far the malice of the intent is
an inference from the mere publication, it is manifestly impossible to punish the intet to bring those who administer
the Government into disrepute or contempt without striking
at the right of freely discussing public characters and measures; because those who engage in such discussions must
expect and intend to excite those unfavorable sentiments,
so far as may be thought to be deserved. To prohibit, there-

fore, the intent to excite those unfavorable sentiments against
those who administer the Government is to prohibit the actual
excitement of them; and to prohibit the actual excitement of
them is equivalent to a prohibition of discussions having that
tendency and effect; which again is equivalent to a protection to those who administer the Government, if they should
at any time deserve the contempt or hatred of the people,
against being exposed to it by free animadversions on their
character and conduct.

* *,6

Mr. Madison's argument raises two questions: (i) Did the pro5
' MADISON'S WRITINGS, VI. 396. For the connection of this point with the freedom
of the press. see the references in note 4o, ante. That the law does not forbid differMICHIGAN
ences of opinion is held generally by the courts today. See my article in
of this
LAW Rmrncw, vol. XVIT. p. 65s5. and note 89. As we shall see in the course
Act
discussion, the separation of facts and opinions is difficult. Again, the Espionage
Press
of Ios7 illustrates the point. See my article on "Freedom of Speech and of the
645. and
in War Time: The Espionage Act." in MICHIGAN LAw Rayxaw, vol. XVII. P.
note S8.
"MADISON'S WRITINOS, VI. 396-397.
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vision permitting the truth to be given in evidence allow a greater
freedom of discussion than was permitted by the common law?
(2) Did the provision which made the intent an essential part of
the crime permit a greater liberty of speech than the common law,
which had made the tendency of the pti6lication the test of criminality? The value of these provisions obviously depended entirely
upon the construction given to them by the courts. It is, therefore,
to the enforcement of them that we must now turn.
(I) Did the provision permitting the truth to be given in evidence
allow a 'greater freedom of discussion than was permitted under
the common law? Theoretically, in these actions a defendant was
allowed to give in evidence the truth of the words spoken or written; and if the truth of the statement was proved it wouldamount
to a justification. Had this been really carried out in the enforcement of the act, greater freedom of discussion would undoubtedly
the
have been allowed than under the common law. The value of
the
of
attitude
the
by
lessened
greatly
was
provision, however,
to
courts, for they required each statement charged to be libelous
defense.
a
to
be proved 'in toto' 'before the truth would amount
Thus, Judge Chase charged the jury:
"That the traverser in his defense must prove every charge
he has made to be true, he must prove it to the marrow. If
he asserts three things and proves but two, he fails in his
defense, for he must prove the whole of his assertions to be
"
true. * *4T
Furthermore, the defendant was required not only to prove every
statement in toto, but sometimes the court held that a defendant
would have to prove an entire charge by a single witness, instead of
adducing a witness for each point. Judge Chase, for example, said:
"That the argument (that one witness could prove a specific point, and another another) suggested convinced his
mind that it would be improper to admit the testimony now
offered to the court; that to admit evidence to an argumentative establishment of the truth of a minute part of the
charge by one witness, and another part by another witness,
would be irregular and subversive of every principle of law.
the Haskell Case,
41Cooper Care, WimArox'S STAT'P TRIALS, pp. 676-677. See also
came up to the
ibid.. 686. judge Peters charged the jury that "unless the justification
offence. it was no defence."

a Callender Case, WHAiTON's STAtz TRIAts, 707.
Judge Griffin.

The charge was concurred in by
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'Whether or not Judge Chase was correct in the position he took
on this occasion, and there is some justification for his stand, the
refusal to admit Colonel Taylor's evidence produced the impression
49

that one could not successfully offer the truth in his defense.

Closely interwoven with the problem of proving the truth of the
statements charged as libelous was that of separating facts from
opinions. In the words, of Mr. Hay, attorney for the defense in the

Callendercase, "* * * the assertion of a fact is the assertion of that
which from its nature is susceptible of direct and positive evidence;

everything else is opinion." 50 What then was the status of erroneous deductions from fact under the Act?

"Will you," asks the court in the Callender case, "call a
man a murderer and a thief; and excuse yourself by saying
it is but mere opinion, or that you have heard so? Any falsehood, however palpable and wicked, may be justified by this

species of argument. The questionh here is with what intent
the traverser published these charges. Are they false, scandalous artd malicious, and published with intent to defame ?""
The cases cited seem to show that the value of the clause per-

mitting truth to ,begiven in evidence was largely nullified by the
action of the court, and without this clause the Sedition Act was
of practically the same force as the common law. As Mr. F. M.

Anderson says:
"**** By refusing to distinguish between fact and opinion, and by requiring that every allegation be fully proved,
' The refusal to admit Colonel Taylor's testimony in this case was one of the bases
of the chargeslater brought against Chase in the impeachment proceedings.
It is usually stated that the Zenger Case (N. Y., 1738) is the leading case on the
admissibility of truth in evidence. There is an earlier case, however, in which similar
arguments were used. See Mr. Emot's argument in the Bayard Case, Howsu.'s STAE
Tkum, vol. XIV. p. 47.T (z701-17o2).
It is probable that neither case made any immediate change in the practice of the
op TnE PRass 7x MAssACHusETTs. V. 11.4 n,)
Mr. C. A. Duniway. (FRaaoa
courts.
has this to say about the Zenger Case.
"Mr. Andrew Hamilton secured his (Zenger's) acquittal by adroit appeals to the
sympathy of the jury, and the result was heralded as a vindication of the rights of
mankind and the liberty of the press. In the development of public opinion toward that
end, the case was indeed a contributing influence, hut it did not secure the freedom of
the press even in New York, and it had no effect upon the law and practice of Massa.
chusetts."
For the later development of this idea, see ScnofEwq, "Freedom of Speech and of
the Press," in IX PaCo nINGS Op THE AMEICAx SocioLozcAr, SocxE'rr; and Hamilton's
argument in People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337 (1804).
N wHAETOx'S STATE T ALS, 693.
a Callender Cate, WnmToi's STATE TIALS. 69.q.
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the courts would deprive 52the provision of all value as a protection for the accused."
(2) The second point raised by Mr. Madison was in regard to
the effect of the provision requiring that the malicious intent should
be proved. The intent was a material element in every offense covered by the act, and, as Judge Chase charged the jury, it "must be
plainly manifest"; for if there is no intent to defame, etc., there is
no offense created by that law.
"The intent, of course, is as much a fact as the publication
of the statements, and must be proved in the same manner
as other facts, and must 'be proved as stated in the law of
Congress."5 s
the
The fact that the courts took it upon themselves to determine
5
intent, however, seemed to "reduce the intent to a fiction," ' for
while they theoretically left the question to the jury, they practically
charged them that the malicious intent was present. For example,
Judge Chase thus charged the jury:
"This conduct showed that he intended to dare and defy
the Government, and to provoke them, and his subsequent
conduct satisfies my mind that such was his disposition. For
he justifies the publication in all its parts, and declares it to
be formed in truth. It is proved to be his publication. * * *
It is your business to consider the intent as coupled with
that, and view the whole together."
Later, Judge Chase said, "Take this publication in all its parts,
and it is the boldest attempt I have known to poison the minds of
the people."' 5
The action of the court in thus assuming the province of the jury
justifies the conclusion that "their summing up left nothing for
honest jurors to. do but to return verdicts of guilty."50
S'"The Enforcement of the Alien nnd Sedition Laws." AxxuAL REPOitT Or TRZ
(1xa) v. x26.
AERICAN HISTMITCAL ASSnCIATiox.
See also ibid., 679.
3WHsARTox's STATz TRTAm, 671.
" See Henry Schofield. IX Psoc. AMts. SociaL. Soc.
agCooper Care. WirArTON's STAT TRIALs. 67x.

56See Schofield. ap. cit.
"Lord Mansfield laid down that the common law test to be applied to determine

the seditious character of publications was their tendency as makers to create and diffuse

among the people an ill opinion of existing public officers, governments, institutions and
laws."

Schofield. op Cit. P. 71.

For judge Mansfield's opinion see Dean of St. Asapl'. Case, 4 Doug. 73, 172 (1784).
See Erskine's argument in the same case.
For an argument against the doctrine of tendency see Furneaux's letter to Blackstone. cuoted in State v. Chandler. 2 Harr. ..-. 6.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

And the same conclusion emerges when we approach the subject

from another angle. Section III of the Sedition Act provided, it
and the
will be recalled, that "the jury shall be judges of the' ' law
7
Attempts
a
cases.
other
in
as
court,
the
of
fact, under the direction
to elucidate this provision developed two points of view with reference to the true province of the jury in libel cases.

The first was

"that the jury were always judges of the law as well as the fact in
58
libel as well as in other cases," and the other that "it is amongst
are to determine the law and
judges
the soundest principles that
said Mr. Bayard, "that
impossible,"
utterly
is
"It
juries the fact."
as to questions of
justly
decide
to
competent
be
can
men
unlettered
law." He knew of "no criminal case in which the jury exercised
such power. "Indeed," he said, "such power would frequently operate against the defendant; for if a jury determine erroneously a
man would have no appeal; whereas, when judges decide wrong,

appeal can be had by writ of error or by appeal to a superior
court."59
Whatever view may be taken of the former practice in libel trials,
Section III of the Sedition Act intended to lay down a definite rule
in future cases. The intention of the act was explained by Mr.
Gallatin as follows:
"It was a principle of common law that a jury in criminal
cases were judges not only of the facts but also of the criminality of the fact. Thus, in a trial for murder, a jury, in
their verdict, had a right not only to declare the bare fact,
to-wit, that A had killed B, but also to decide whether the
act of killing was criminal or not, and if criminal to what
degree; and it had, therefore, never been disputed that in
that case a jury might bring in their verdict of self-defense,
manslaughter, or murder. Upon the same principle, it was
evident that in cases of libel a jury should have a right not
only to decide the bare fact, to-wit, whether the accused perI?5

PST. STAT. AT L.. qg6:ANALs STH CONG.. 111. 3776-3777.

See Mr. Harper's speech. Azizx.s .TH CoxG.. IT. 2.1.

The confusion on this point was probably due to the fact
the provision "put it into the power of the jury to
that
considered
Bayard
that Mr.
U

Mr. Blayard, ibid., 2136.

declare that this is an unconstitutional law, instead of leaving it to he determined,
where it ought to be determined 'by the judiciary," while the others considered that the
law meant only to give the jury the power to declare "guilty or not guilty," or the
power of handing in a special verdict. See Mr. Otis' speech. ANNA s STH CONG., IL,
213.5.

See N. Smith's speech

(ANNALS

.5TH CONG., II.

213.5-2I36.

as proof of the exist-

ing confusion of ideas as to the power conferred on the jury by the provision giving
them the right to determine "the law and the fact." Mr. Smith thought the provision
gave the jury the right to consider the legality of testimony.
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son was the author or publisher of a certain writing, but also
to decide whether that writing was criminal or not, whether
it was libel or no libel. ** *"60
In other words, the Sedition Act intended to plate libel trials upon
the same basis as other trials. It was undoubtedly supposed to embody the reforms which were thought to have been established itt
" ANNALS .5TH CONG.. IT. 21.37.
Mr. W. Claiborne summarized the situation thus: "In Great Britain, it had here,
tofore been the practice for the jury. in cases of libel, to find the fact of publication
and the courts were left to judge with respect to the law. * * *" That, indeed, was the
status which the press had assumed, but Mr. Harper. in the speech he quotes above.
had correctly stated the theory. See STEPHEN, HISroaY OF CRIMINAL LAW, IT. . See also FORSYTH. HisToy OF TRIAL 3Y JMUY, P. 2a2: Rex v. Burdett, 4 B. and Aid. i I.
in regard to the province of the
The controversy which had arisen in Congresu
jury reflects the prevailing uncertainty of opinion on that subject. Even the courts'
decisions were not clear on the point. -For example, Chief justice Jay, in Brailsford
v. Gearjio. 3 DalI. x-4 had thus charged the jury:
"It will not be amiss, here. Gentlemen. to remind you of the good old rule, that
on oueations of fact. it is the province of the jury. on cuestions of law it is the
province of the court to decide. But it must be observed, that by the same law. which
recognizes this reasonable distribution of jurisdiction, you have nevertheless a right to
take upon yourselves to judge of both, and to determine the law as well as the fact in
controversy. On this, and on every other occasion, however, we have no doubt, you
will pay that respect, which is due to the opinion of the court. For, as on the ond
hand, it is presumed, that juries are the best judges of fact; it is, on the other hand,
both objects are lawpresumable, that the court are the best judges of law. But still
fully, within your power of decision."
Two questions, then, present themselves for discussion: (I) What was the common
law in regard to the province of the jury? and (a) How did the Sedition Act change
the common law.
(I) The theory of the common law in regard to the province of jury is expressed
in the maxim "ad ouestionem juris respondent judices, ad questionem facti respondent
juratores," but this theory was never true. if taken exactly. "Its true significance,"
says Professor Thayer (IV HARP. L. REv. x49). was that:
"In general, issues of fact. and only issues of fact are to be tried by jury: when
they are so tried, the jury and not the court are to find the facts, and the court and
not the jury is to give the rule of law: the jury are not to refer the evidence to the
judge and ask his judgment upon that, but are to find the facts which the evidence
tends to establish, and may only ask the court for their judgment upon these * * "
On the other hafid, says Prof. Sunderland (a9 YALE LAw Jous. as5) "there is no
evidence to show that the common law required that the jury should have anything to
do with matters of law." In fact, the common law maxim was intended primarily to
impose restrictions upon the jury, and "any legal controversy could be so conducted
that no question of facts affecting the merits of the case could possibly come up for
final determination, until the jury had been -discharged."
Whatever power the jury possessed to consider the law in a case was exercised by
means of the general verdict. According to the theory of the law, even this practice
was questionable, for Coke had declared (a CoxE ON LITTLETON, sec. 368):
may
"Although the juries if they will take upon them the knowledge of the law,
do mistake
give a general verdict, yet it is dangerous for them so to do, or if they
the law, they runne into the danger of an attaint; therefore to find the special matter
is the safest way where the case is doubtful"
to request
The fear of punishment in case they mistook the law frequently led juries
(II s86 C.
permission to hand in special verdicts, and it was declared in Donnan Case
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England by 1ox's Libel Act in 1792.41 But in practice it failed to
accomplish the purpose for which it was enacted, since the judges,
B., 9 Coke, 7, xa) that the practice of rendering special verdicts was in accordance
with- the common law. Also it was said that statute of Westminster II, Chap. 30, which
gave juries a similar privilege, was merely declaratory of the common law.
Finally, should the juries hand in a verdict which was contrary to the law in the
ease, the court could ignore their verdict.
Thus it appears that the jury had no real part in the determination of questions
of law, and, as we shall see, even their tright to consider the facts was considerably
modified by the power of the court to shape the form of pleading.
With special zeference to libel cases, it may be shown that the jury had little
to do with the determination of the criminality of a publication. The theory undet
.Which"their power was curtailed was clearly pointed out by Chief justice Shaw in
1;om. v. Anther, S Gray, p. a4; "that when the words of the alleged libel are exactly
copied, and all the circumstances and incidents which can affect their meaning are stated
in the. record, inasmuch as the construction and interpretation of language, when thus
explained, is for the court, the question of the legal character of such libel * * would
be pl~ced on the record, and, therefore, as a question of law, woul4 be open after
'verdict on a motion in arrest of judgment."
. Under the common law, then, in practice, the jury could determine only the fact
of publication and the truth of the innuendos. They might be said to have no func,tion, for the fact of publication was usually admitted, and the meaning of the inhuendos was so clear as to be unmistakable.
What changes in the iommon law were supposed to have been made by the Sedition
Act? (x) The 3ury were given the power (a) to determine the law and (b) to deterrine the fact; (a) both of these powers were to be exercised under the direction of the
court, as in other cases. Let us discus these points briefly.
(a) What was mfant by the provision which allowed the jury to determine the
law.? Only that the jury should have 'the right to compare the alleged libel with the
law, and to declare whether or not the defendant was guilty of the crime penalized by
the Act. In other words, the jury were to determine the criminality of the act. As
the jury did not have the general power of pronouncing "guilty" or "not guilty" under
the common- law, the Sedition Act was supposed to be less severe than the common law
of libels.
(b) The right of determining the fact was more important, for, according to the
Sedition Act, the intehst was the most important fact to be considered. The jury had
to' decide, therefore, whether or not the defendant had published the alleged libel, snd,
if so, with what intent. ,But, as we have seen, the court practically determined the
intent, and charged the jury in such a way as to interfere with their free determination
of the matters. While theoretically the right of the jury to pass upon facts was enlarged, actually it .wab not, and the provision which required the criminal intent to be
proved was of no more value to the defendant than the common law doctrine of tendency has been.
The proper function of the court in the cases arising under the Sedition Act was
to help the jury reach a decision. The court could properly give the jury instructions
as to what the law is upon one supposition or another, and could see that the arguments were confined to the issue. On the other hand, the court was given no power
to pass upon the-fact of publication, or the intent with which it was made.
G'An incidental phase of the enforcement of the Sedition Act was the contention
that the jury, having been given the right to determine the "law" in libel cases, could
pass upon the constitutionality of the Sedition Act. Thus Mr. Wirt, an attorney for
the defense in the Callender Case, (WHASToN's STAT TWaS, 7o9), presents the following argument:
"In"Virginia, an Act of the Assembly having adopted the" common law of England,
that common law, therefore, possesses in this State all the energy of a legislative act.
By an act of Congress, the rules of proceedings in Federal Coults, in the several states
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as we have seen, took it upon themselves to instruct the jury as to
the intent of the traverser. In the long run, however, this section
has proved of the greatest importance; and the vital reforms which

it introduces is today a part of the procedural law of every State
of the Union.
are directed to conform to the rules in the States In which such court may be in
session; by an act of Congress, it is therefore provided, that the practices of the courts
of Virginia shall be observed in,this court. To ascertain your power, therefore, as a
jury, we have only to refer to the common law of England, which has been adopted in
the laws of this State, and which defines the powers of juries in the State courts. By
the common law of England, juries possess the power of considering and deciding the
law as well as the fact in every case which may come before them. * * * If, then, a
jury in a court of the State would have a right to decide the law as well as the fact,
so have you. The Federal Constitution is the supreme law of the land; and a right to
consider the law is a right to consider the Constitution; if. a law of Congress under
which we are indicted be an infraction of the Constitution, it has not the force of a
law, and if'you were to find the traverser guilty, uder such an act, you woul4 violati
your oath."
Mr. Wirts argument that the common law was in force in Virginia and that consequently the jury could determine the law in the case, is of little importance. The
province of the jury was described in the Sedition Act itself, and whatever special
power the jury had Was given to it by the terms of the statute.
Mr. Nicholas, in the same case, thought that the jury could declare the law "null
and void, if they thought it unconstitutional"
The contrary view is more logical. It is thus stated by judge Chase in the Calleadar Case (WHAsoxN's STATE TRIALS, 713):
"By this provision I understand that a right is given to the jury to determin
what the law is in the case before them; and not to decide whether a statute of the
United States * * 0 is a law or not, or whether it is void, under an opinion that it is
unconstitutional, that is, contrary to the Constitution of the United States. I admit
that the jury are to compare the statute with the facts proved, and then to determine
whether the acts done are -prohibited by the law; and whether they amount to the
offence described in the indictment. This power the jury necessarily poss6sses, in order
to enable them to decide on the guilt or innocence of the person accused. It is one
theory to decide what the law is, on the facts proved, and another and very different
thing, to determine that the statute produced is no law. To decide what the law is -on
the facts, is an admission that the law exists. If there be no law in the case, then
there can be no comparison between it and the facts; and it is unnecessary to establish facts before it is ascertained that there is a law to punish the commission of them.
"The existence of the law is a previous inquiry, and the inquiry into facts is altogether unnecessary if there is no law to which the facts can apply. By the right to
decide what the law is in any case arising under the statute, I cannot conceive that
a right is given to the petit jury to determine whether the statute * * * is unconstituthe United
tional or not. To determine the validity of the statute, the Constitution of
States must necessarily be resorted to and considered, and its provisions inquired into.
It must be dettrmined whether the statute alleged to be void. because contrary to the
Was it ever
Constitution. is prohibited by it expresslv or by necessary implication.
that it should
intended by the framers of the Constitution. or by the people of America.
are expressly
ever be submitted to an examination of a jury, to decide what restrictions
believe that Conor impliedly imposed by the national legislature? I cannot possibly
declare a statute void."
gress intended by the statute, to grant a right to a petit jury to
of passing upon
Assuming that Congress had intended to give the jury the power
the constitutionality of the act, Judge Chase said:
"Congress had no authority to vest it in any body whatsoever, because, by the
Constitution, the right is expressly granted to the judicial power of the United States,
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The final constitutional objection raised by the Republicans was
that the Sedition Act contravened the elective principle. The argument is based on two contentions: (I) that free examination of
public men and measures is necessary to insure a free election; and
(2) that the imprisonment of officers-elect for violation of the Sedition Act constituted an interference with the right of the people to
choose freely their representatives to Congress.
Let us now discuss these points briefly:
(I) The necessity for freedom of discussion in regard to public
men and measures is pointed out by Ebenezer Rhoades, editor of
the Independent Chronicle, as follows:
"The first great principles of civil liberty are that all legislative power proceeds from the people; that they have a
right to inquire into the official conduct of their substitutes,
the rulers :-to censure public measures when found to be
wrong, and to use constitutional means to remove those who
violate the confidence reposed in them. These principles
require that there should be a public and free examination
of the doings of the government. Information on these subjects cannot be generally disseminated but through -the
medium of newspapers. It is therefore necessary to the
existence of civil liberty that these should be open to the
writers who discuss8 2freely public manners, and even censure
them when faulty. 1

and is recognized by Congress by perpetual statute. If the statute should be held void
by a jury, it would seem that they could not claim a right to such decision under an
act that they themselves consider as mere waste paper."
The view expressed by Judge Chase is undoubtedly correct. It is a well-established principle that the jury cannot pronounce upon the constitutionality of a law of
Congress, and his statement in regard to the proper province of the jury is in substantial accord with that expressed by Mr. Gallatin. This theory, had it been carried
into effect, would have assigned a larger province to the jury than that which it occupied
under the common law.
judge Chase thought that the state law recognized the power of the judiciary to
pass upon the constitutionality of a law. This opinion was based upon Kemper v. Haupki,.s, a Virginia case of that period. A similar question came up in other cases. See
Iredell 3. in Northampton Insurgents Case, WiaToN's STATE TRIASS, 588.
The evils of a system under which the jury could pa-us upon the constitutionality of
an act of Congress are discussed by Judge Chase in the Callender Case, WHARTON'S
See also Paterson J., ibid.. 336.
STATE TRIALS, 714.
For further discussion of the province of the jury, see Com. v. Anthes, 5 Gray;
285-303 (x85).
G'See BUCKINGHAX), RsEmNiscENcEs, I. 26x; Independent Chronicle, May, x799,
quoted in DusrxwAy. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN MASS.. pp. 145-146 and n. See also the
II, 2144: and the argument of the Virginia
speech of Mr. Nicholas, ANNALS .5TH CONGo..
Legislative Committee, MADISON'S WRITINGS, VI, 397-398. The justice of the repression
of such information is discussed in MADIsoN's WRITINGS, VI, 394-395. For the use of
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The same argument was made when the sedition cases came to
trial. For example, Mr. Cooper took the position that "the people
cannot exercise on rational grounds their elective franchise if perfect freedom of discussion of public characters be not allowed."
"Electors," said Mr. Cooper, "are bound in conscience to reflect and
decide-who best deserves their suffrages; but how can they do it if
these prosecutions in terrorem close all the avenues of information
'and throw a veil over the grossest misconduct of our periodical
rulers ?""
The enforcement of the Sedition Act was calculated to strengthen
the arguments which we have reviewed. Thus, in the Cooper case,
the defendant was convicted, although Judge Chase admitted that
"his evident design was to arouse the people against the President
6
so as to influence their minds against him on the next election." '
The second phase of the subject is presented by the Lyon
(2)
case. The defendant, a Congressman from Vermont, was convicted
under the Sedition Act and sentenced to imprisonment. While he
the above Republican argument as a refutation of the argument of necessity, see M.
Nicholas' speech, AxxArs s STH CONG., III, 3006"3007.
Cooper Case, WHAtrox's STATE TRIALS, 665.
Cooper Case, WHARTox'S STATE TRALs, 671.
Speking further as to the intent of Cooper, Judge Chase said that his conduct
(Cooper's) "showed that he intended to dare and defy the Government, and to provoke
them, and his subsequent conduct satisfies my mind that such was his disposition. For
he justifies the publication in allits parts, and declares it to be founded in truth * *
Thus the attempt of the accused to avail himself of the privilege of giving the truth
in evidence was used as a proof of his criminal intent. While Judge Chase told the
jury that his opinions were not to influence their decision, they undoubtedly did.
The Cooper Case arose out of the publication of a letter from Dr. Priestly to
President Adams in regard to a vacancy in office. This communication, President Adams
had published. As the publication of the letter seemed to imply that the request was
improper, Mr. Cooper answered through the public prints, saying:
"Nor do I see any impropriety in making the request of Mr. Adams. At that time
he had just entered into office; he was hardly in the infancy of his political mistakes;
even those who doubted his capacity thought well of his intentions. Nor were we yet
saddled with the expensive existence of a permanent navy. or threatened, under his
auspices, with the existence of a standing army. Our credit was not yet reduced so
low as to borrow money at eight per cent in times of peace, while the unnecessary
not
violence of official expression might justly have provoked a war. Mr. Adams had
he interyet projected his embassies to Prussia, Russia and the Sublime Porte, nor had
justice,
fered, as President of the United States, to influence the decision of a court of
an
a stretch of authority which the monarch of Great Britain would have shrunk from,
case
interference without precedent against law and against mercy. This melancholy
British
of Jonathan Robbins, a native citizen of America, forcilbly impressed by the
a
court martial, had not yet astonished 'the republican citizenq of this free country:
before the
case too little known, but of which the people ought to be fully apprised
(WsArroN's STATz TRIALs. 656).
election, and they shall be."
President
The expres4ons I have ouoted refer entirely to the public conduct of
They
Adams, and were certainly as temperate as most expressions of political opinion.
would undoubtedly be considered harmless today.
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was in prison Lyon was reelected to Congress from his district, but
could not take his seat in the House until after the expiration of his
sentence. It has been urged that the temporary absence of Mr.
Lyon from the House deprived the people of their right of representation.6 5 It seems too clear for argument, however, that if Mr.
Lyon was guilty of a crime his imprisonment was not an interference with the right of the people to choose their representatives
freely.
The real issue presented in both the Cooper and the Lyon cases

is not whether these prosecutions interfered with the right of election, but whether the Sedition Act itself constituted an infringenent of the freedom of speech. The evidence is conclusive that,
as enforced in these two cases, the liberty of discussion68was reduced
to the limits set by the common law of seditious libel.
It would not be just to leave the reader of this paper under the
impression that the Republicans approved of the free publication
of libels. It was not their wish to protect the libeler from punishment ;6T but the fear of the abuse of the authority on the part of the

National Government caused them to desire that prosecutions for

Lyon was accused of publishing a letter with intent to "bring the President
and Government of the United States into contempt. etc." The fact of publication being
admitted. Lyon wa convicted ani sentenced. The withdrawal of Lyon from the House
of Representatives. of which he was an active member in opposition to the administration. was of national political importance. It was said that "Lyon's refusal to accept
aid to escape, or to sue for pardon, placed the administration in an awkward position
so that "the cabinet panted for an excuse to liberate him." By a majority over all his
opponents Lyon was re-elected to -Congress from his district. Upon his release from
prison, Lyon took his seat in the House, in spite of an attempt to impeach him. See
WHRTrON's STATr. TRIAx.s, 3.3"143.

"Turning aside from the constitutional questions to which the Sedition Act gave
let us consider the Act as it was interpreted by the courts.
rise,
We consider first the legal definition of a publication. Since the courts gave no
decision on the point, we may adopt the statement of the attorney for the Government
in the Callender Case as authoritative. "That the direct or indirect circulation or emission of a libel is a publication thereof in law and in fact," said Mr. Nelson, "has never
been questioned in a court of law." (Callender Case, WEAgRO i's STATz T=rAxs, zoS.
According to Judge McKenn, in the Cabbett Case, WHARTON, p. 322).
A libel under the common law, was "any writings, pictures or the like, of an hao
moral or illegal tendency," but as used under the Sedition Act the word implied "a
malicious defamation of a national officer, made public by writing or printing, in order to
expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule." (See ante p. 2, for the definition
of the crime penalized by this act.)
As I have previously stated, the intent was an essential fact to be proved; and this,
as well as the other facts, have to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
The crime, then, penalized by the Second Section of the Sedition Act was the
direct or indirect circulation or emission of words or writings which were uttered with
the intent to expose any national officer to hatred, contempt or ridicule.
O Even Jefferson, in z8o3, wrote to Judge McKean suggesting that action be taken
against the violent agitation of the Federalists. See W3,1INGs oF JEPxssox, [Ford ed.]
vol. -,

p. -.
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libel should belong exclusively to State courts. Thus, Mr. Madison
says:
s* * * But the laws for the correction of calumny
were
might
expression
or
writing
not defective. Every libelous
receive its punishment in State courts, from juries summoned -by an officer ,who does not receive his appointment
from the President, and is under no influence to court the
pleasure of the Government, whether it injured public officer
or private citizen. Nor is there any distinction in the Constitution empowering Congress exclusively to punish calumny
directed against an officer of the general Government; so
that a construction assuming the power of protecting the
reputation of a citizen officer will extend to the case of any
other citizen, and open to Congress a right of legislation in
68
every conceivable case which can arise between individuals."
In the last analysis, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that
the Republicans were far less actuated in their opposition to the
Sedition Act by zeal for the liberty of the press than by jealousy for
state rights.
ConstitutionalResults
It remains now only to summarize the constitutional results
reached by the preceding discussion. They may be briefly. stated
thus:
(I) There is no common law of the United States. Consequently, the fact that under the common law prosecutions for libel
could take place does not furnish a basis for the argument that
similar prosecutions can take place under the United States Constitution.
No special authority over the press was given to Congress
(2)
by the Constitution. On the other hand, by virtue of the necessary
and proper clause, Congress might exercise such control over the
press as was necessary to enable it to carry its powers into execution.
For Jefferson's opinions in regard to the Sedition Act in Jefferson's letters, see
[Ford ed.] vol. VIL
the
- MADISON'S WRITINGS, VII, 334-335. See also the address of the Assembly to
people of Virginia, M insOa's WRITINGS, VI, 353"354; Mr. Macon's opinion, ANAmS
STE CONG., II, a1SI; Mr. Nicholas' opinion, ibid., II1, 3014; Mr. Livingston's charge
against the Federalists, ibid., II, a1S3-21S4.
For charges that the Federalists could use the law to perpetuate their power, see,
ibid.,
MADISON'S WRITINGS, VI, 393-394 and 338-339; ANNALS STH CONG., II, 263-264;
IT. 2104: ibid.. II. 2110.
the GovThe Federalists feared that the Republicans were attempting to overthrow
ernment. See Mr. Allen's Speech, ANNALS STH CONG., I. 2098.
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(3) Whatever definition of the terms of the First Amendment
may be adopted, it cannot be considered to amount to a positive
denial to Congress of any power over the press.
(4) Truly considered, "freedom of the press" seems to imply that
the press shall be free to publish such sentiments as do not interfere
with the exercise by the Government of its constitutional functions.
(5) The Sedition Act, as it was enforced, was little, if any, less
severe than the common law bf libels.
(6) Theoretically, a new province was assigned to the jury in
libel cases; and although the reforms intended -by the act were not
established in these cases arising under it, on account of the attitude
of the courts, they have since become well established.
Finally, a word should be said as to the impression produced by
the Sedition Act. "Charges of unfairness," says Mr. F. M. Anderson, "were numerous. They turned chiefly upon alleged packing
of juries, the construction of the law by the courts, and the general
deportment of the judges at the trial."69
Add to this statement the fact that the accused was usually a Republican, while the Federalists were permitted to libel the Republicans (then out of office), and the fact that the libelers were harshly
treated in prison, as men who were suspected of treason, and we
can account for the resentment aroused by these few cases.
An exaggerated political importance, perhaps, has been assigned
to the- Sedition Act by historians." At any rate, some authorities
now assert that "it is impossible to trace any connection whatever
between the Alien and Sedition laws and the Virginia and Kentucky
Resolutions, on the one hand, and the defeat of Adams on the
other."71 Certain it is that a great deal of local resentment was
aroused by the enforcement of the act, but it is difficult to show
that the election turned upon that alone.
03F. X. Anderson. "Enforcement of Alien and Sedition Laws." AxNUAL RE'oitT
AM=s. HBsT. Assnc'x. (iox2) P. i2..
t See Fxsxz, C(TxcAL Pm1oD.
T1CHANfING, HISTORY OF U. S., voL. IV. p. 232. See also F. M. Anderson, "A
M
Contemporary View of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions," in 5 AME . HXST. Rrv.
45-2a5.

After all. there were comparatively few prosecutions under the act. Some "24 or
as persons were arrested. At least :5, and probably more were indicted. Only zo, and
possibly xx. cases came to trial. In io case, the accused were pronotinced guilty. The
eleventh case may have been an acaulttal. but the report of it is entirely unconirmed."
REP.Am. Hs.
F. M. Anderson. "Enforcement of Alien and Sedition Laws." Azcz.
AssOC'N., ig92. P. 12o.

Mr. Anderson has discussed the details of these cases fully and in a scholarly way.
I have not thought it necessary to do anything more along the line which he la
followed.
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The chief importance of the Sedition Act is that it is the last act
of its kind that has been passed by the National Government. Yet,
as to the status of the press in the future, one is inclined to agree
with Hamilton that "its security, whatever fine declarations may be
inserted in any Constitution respecting it, must altogether depend
and on the general spirit of the people and the
upon public ' opinion
government. 7"72
THOMAS F. CARRoLL.
gvne.
Princeton, New Jersey.
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